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Abstract
In 1976 Stephen Hawking proposed that information may be lost from our
universe as a pure quantum state collapses gravitationally into a black hole,
which then evaporates completely into a mixed state of thermal radiation.
Although this proposal is controversial, it is tempting to consider analogous
processes that might occur in certain theories of consciousness. For example,
one might postulate that independent degrees of freedom be ascribed to the
mental world to help explain the feeling of a correlation between one’s de-
sires and one’s choice of actions. If so, one might ask whether information in
the physical world can be lost to such postulated degrees of freedom in the
mental world. Or, one might hypothesize that the mental world can affect
the physical world by modifying the quantum action for the physical world in
a coordinate-invariant way (analogous to the alpha parameters in wormhole
theory).
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As a result of his 1974 calculation [1, 2] of thermal emission from black holes,
Hawking argued [3] that a pure quantum state that underwent gravitational collapse
into a black hole would end up as a mixed quantum state of thermal radiation.
This proposal has continued to be controversial, and in the conference lecture being
reported here, I discussed various alternatives and arguments for and against them.
However, as I have little to add in print to these arguments since my recent review
of this subject [4] and subsequent research paper [5], here I shall instead briefly turn
to some analogous ideas that I have been considering concerning consciousness.
I have developed a framework, which I call Sensible Quantum Mechanics, for
relating conscious perceptions to the quantum state of the universe and for in-
terpreting quantum mechanics. Since the basics of this framework are also to be
published elsewhere [6, 7], here I shall merely summarize it briefly and then consider
some speculations that go beyond it in a way that is somewhat analogous to the
suggestion of information loss in black holes.
Sensible Quantum Mechanics is given by the following two basic postulates:
Measure Axiom for Perceptions: There is a fundamental measure µ(S) for
each subset S of the “mental world,” the set M of all perceptions p.
Sensible Quantum Axiom: The measure µ(S) is given by the expectation
value of an “awareness operator” A(S), a positive-valued-operator (POV) measure
[8], in the quantum state of the “physical world”:
µ(S) = 〈A(S)〉 = 〈ψ|A(S)|ψ〉 = Tr[A(S)ρ], (1)
Here the third expression applies if the quantum state is represented by the
wavefunction or pure state |ψ〉, and the fourth expression applies if the quantum
state is represented by the statistical operator or density matrix ρ. (The second
expression can apply in more general situations, such as in C∗-algebra.)
Since all sets S of perceptions with µ(S) > 0 really occur in this framework,
it is completely deterministic if the quantum state and the A(S) are determined:
there are no random or truly probabilistic elements in this framework of Sensible
Quantum Mechanics. Nevertheless, because the framework has measures for sets of
perceptions, one can readily use them to calculate quantities that can be interpreted
as conditional probabilities. One can consider sets of perceptions S1, S2, etc., defined
in terms of properties of the perceptions. For example, S1 might be the set of
perceptions in which there is a feeling that the universe is approximately described
by a Friedman-Robertson-Walker model, and S2 might be the set of perceptions
in which there is a feeling that the age of the universe (at the perceived time) is
between ten and twenty billion years. Then one can interpret
P (S2|S1) ≡ µ(S1 ∩ S2)/µ(S1) (2)
as the conditional probability that the perception is in the set S2, given that it
is in the set S1. In our example, this would be the conditional probability that
a perception including the feeling that the universe is approximately described by
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a Friedman-Robertson-Walker model, also has the feeling that at the time of the
perception the age is between ten and twenty billion years.
Thus in Sensible Quantum Mechanics, probabilities don’t (apply to) “matter”;
they are only in the “mind.”
In order to get quantities associated with a single perception p and to test and
compare different theories, assume the set M of perceptions is a suitable topological
space with a prior measure
µ0(S) =
∫
S
dµ0(p). (3)
Let
A(S) =
∫
S
E(p)dµ0(p), (4)
µ(S) = 〈A(S)〉 =
∫
S
dµ(p) =
∫
S
m(p)dµ0(p), (5)
m(p) = 〈E(p)〉 = 〈ψ|E(p)|ψ〉 = Tr[E(p)ρ], (6)
A rather natural hypothesis to add to the basic framework of Sensible Quantum
Mechanics is that each E(p), which I call a perception operator, is a projection
operator P (p) onto an ‘eigenstate of perception’ (perhaps a technically ‘unphysical’
state, one that does not obey the constraint equations, such as the Wheeler-DeWitt
equations, since presumably P (p) would not commute with the constraints, but this
makes no difference for calculating its expectation value so long as one has an inner
product on the full space of unconstrained states). However, one can think of many
other possible restrictions on the form of E(p) [6, 7].
Some possibilities for the prior measure µ0(S) are the following:
µ
(1)
0 (S) = N(S) = number of perceptions in S (if discrete), (7)
µ
(2)
0 (S) = Tr[A(S)] (if awareness operators are of trace class), (8)
µ
(3)
0 (S) =
∫
S
g1/2(p)dnp (if M has a Riemannian metric, e.g., (9)
gijdp
idpj = Tr{[E(pi + dpi)− E(pi)][E(pj + dpj)− E(pj)]}, if finite). (10)
Now agreement with observation can be tested by the typicality of one’s percep-
tion p: Let S≤(p) be the set of perceptions p
′ with m(p′) ≤ m(p). Then one can, in
a rather ad hoc way, define a ‘typicality’
T (p) = µ(S≤(p))/µ(M), (11)
which, in the case in which m(p) varies continuously, has a uniform distribution
between 0 and 1 for p chosen randomly with the infinitesimal measure dµ(p). There-
fore, using this particular criterion and assuming that one’s perception p is indeed
typical in this regard, one might say that agreement with observation requires that
the prediction, by the theory in question, of T (p) for one’s observation p be not too
much smaller than unity.
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One could of course instead use any other property of perceptions which places
them into an ordered set to define a corresponding ‘typicality.’ For example, I might
be tempted to order them according to their complexity, if that could be well defined.
Thinking about this alternative ‘typicality’ leaves me surprised that my own present
perception seems to be highly complicated but apparently not infinitely so. What
simple complete theory could make a typical perception have a high but not infinite
complexity?
However, the ‘typicality’ defined by Eq. (11) has the merit of being defined
purely from the prior and fundamental measures, with no added concepts such as
complexity that would need to be defined. Furthermore, if one makes one of the
proposals of Eq. (7)-(10), then both the fundamental and the prior measures are
determined by the quantum state and by either the awareness operators A(S) or by
the perception operators E(p), so the number of basic elements is rather minimal.
Returning to the definition given by Eq. (10) for the typicality, one can use a
Bayesian approach and assign prior probabilities P (Hi) to hypotheses Hi that give
particular theoretical predictions for a measure density mi(p) over all perceptions
and hence assign a particular typicality Ti(p) to one’s perception. (For example, one
might choose to set P (Hi) = 2
−ni, where ni is the rank of Hi in order of increasing
complexity, in order to give the simpler theories higher prior probabilities. To do
this, one would need to assume some particular background knowledge whith respect
to which one might define ‘complexity.’) Although a perception p can be said to
exist in each theory that gives mi(p) > 0, so that the existence of the perception has
unit probability in each, one can instead take the typicality of the perception and
interpret its probability of being so small, which is Ti(p) itself (since the typicality
has a uniform distribution), as the probability associated with the perception p in
the hypothesis Hi. This may then be called the likelihood of Hi given p. By Bayes’
rule, the posterior conditional probability that one should then rationally assign to
the hypothesis Hi, if one followed this prescription of interpreting the typicality as
the conditional probability (given the hypothesis Hi) for one’s particular perception
p, would be
P (Hi|p) =
P (p|Hi)Ti(p)∑
j P (p|Hj)Tj(p)
. (12)
There is the potential problem that the right side of Eq. (11) may have both
numerator and denominator infinite, which makes the typicality Ti(p) inherently
ambiguous. Then one might use instead
Ti(p;S) = µi(S≤(p) ∩ S)/µi(S) (13)
for some set of perceptions S containing p that has µi(S) finite for each hypothesis
Hi. This is a practical limitation anyway, since one could presumably only hope to
be able to compare the measure densities m(p) for some small set of perceptions
rather similar to one’s own. Unfortunately, this makes the resulting P (Hi|p) depend
on this chosen S as well as on the other postulated structures.
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In Sensible Quantum Mechanics, the measure for all sets S of perceptions in
the mental world is determined by the physical world (i.e., the quantum state),
along with the awareness operators. This seems to leave mysterious the correlation
between will and action: why do I do as I please? That is, why is my desire to do
something I feel am capable of doing apparently correlated with my perception of
actually doing it? One might seek to explain this by going beyond Sensible Quantum
Mechanics to a framework, say to be called Sensational Quantum Mechanics, in
which the mental world acts back on the physical world.
One way in which this could be done, going beyond the framework of Sensible
Quantum Mechanics without violating it, would be for desires in the mental world
to affect the action functional that is used in a particular Feynman path integral
to define the quantum state. If this modification of the action were done in a
coordinate-invariant way, it would not violate local energy-momentum conservation.
Instead, this would be analogous to the way in which Coleman [9] proposed that baby
universes may adjust effective coupling constants in our universe (such as setting
the cosmological constant or gravitating energy density to zero) via wormholes (the
analogue of Descartes’ pineal glands [10]).
There are also other less conservative ways in which one might postulate that
mind affects matter. For example, one might imagine a modification of the action in
a coordinate-dependent way, so that coordinate invariance is broken. Or, one might
imagine that the quantum state is modified in such a way that it cannot be given
by any Feynman path integral with any form of the action.
Another way in which the mental world might affect the physical world is by
changing the boundary conditions of the path integral that defines the quantum
state in terms of the actional functional. As in all the ways mentioned so far, once
the modified quantum state of the physical world is determined, the framework of
Sensible Quantum Mechanics could apply without alteration.
One might go on to consider mind-body interactions which violate the framework
of Sensible Quantum Mechanics. For example, one might consider quantum theories
in which the wavefunction really collapses. Then one might imagine that the mental
world could conceivably influence the time at which a collapse occurs, the eigenbasis
in which the collapse takes place, and the specific eigenvector outcome (if it indeed
results in a pure state).
Another proposal that could not be incorporated within Sensible Quantum Me-
chanics is that the measure on sets of conscious perceptions is not determined by
expectation values in the quantum state but rather is determined by the trajectory
in configuration space that is an essential part of the formalism of Bohm’s version
of quantum mechanics [11]. This by itself need not lead to any influence of mind on
matter, but one could imagine modifications in which the mental world affects the
Bohmian trajectories, say by providing a new consciousness force.
Finally, to get to a proposal in which one can consider the possibility of infor-
mation loss in conscious beings, one might hypothesize that conscious perceptions
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are new perceptual degrees of freedom that simply have not been included previ-
ously in physics. For example, they might be quantum variables, new arguments of
the wavefunction of the extended world. (Alternatively, they might be semiclassical
variables in a hybrid semiclassical theory, so that the perceptions themselves, and
not just the measures on sets of them, are determined by expectation values of the
quantum physical variables and may also act back to affect the quantum state itself.
However, I shall not consider this possibility further here.)
Presumably these new quantum variables of conscious perceptions would interact
with the old ones (which I shall continue to call the physical world or matter, since it
or its quantum state is what we are now familiar with as the physical world, though
I would not object to the terminology of someone else who might prefer to combine
both sets of quantum variables in his definition of the physical world, so long as
we are clear in each discussion which terminology is being used). This interaction
represents the effect of matter on mind and of mind on matter.
Such an interaction allows the conceptual possibility, analogous to what Hawking
proposed for black holes, of information loss in conscious beings. For example, one
could imagine an initial state which is a product state of a pure state for the (old)
physical variables and some arbitrary state of the mental variables. But then as the
two variables interact, one gets an entangled state that is no longer a product state
and hence no longer gives a pure state for the physical variables when traced out
over the mental variables.
So far, this possibility is analogous to information loss into a persisting black hole,
which is not very controversial (though the allowed amount might be, particularly
for small persisting black hole remnants). But one could ask the question of what
happens if one starts with no conscious beings, they evolve out of a state that was
initially purely physical, and then they die out. Can the excitations of the mental
variables disappear with the conscious beings, say into a mental singularity, taking
the information they had with them, so that in the end it no longer resides within
the physical universe? This would be analogous to what Hawking proposes happens
to the information that falls into a black hole (that had formed out of an initial non-
black-hole state) when (and if) the black hole completely disappears. (Of course,
this information loss in conscious beings is by no means required even if conscious
beings appear and disappear within the system, since they could be like photons
that are emitted and absorbed without any loss of unitarity in ordinary systems
[12]. However, here I am exploring the conceptual possibility that consciousness
might lead to a loss of information as Hawking proposes black holes do. Admittedly,
the analogy between consciousness and black holes is tenuous. The main similarly
is that we don’t yet understand the quantum nature of either.)
To test whether information is lost in conscious beings, one apparently would
need to construct a closed physical system in a particular pure state, wait a sufficient
time for conscious beings to evolve and die out, and then measure the system. With
a sufficiently large ensemble of similarly-prepared systems and a sufficiently large
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set of different measurements on the final systems (a number at least of the order
of the square of the dimension of the relevant Hilbert space for each system), one
could in principle determine the density matrix of each and thereby determine to
some approximation whether it was pure (assuming the systems were sufficiently
isolated that they remained uncorrelated, and assuming that they each evolved the
same way to identical final density matrices). Of course, in practice it would be
impossible to perform most of the large number of measurements needed, and there
might even be restrictions in principle to performing them, since measurements are
restricted to the interactions actually occurring in nature, and since one has the
restrictions of the properties of the quantum state of the universe (e.g., the second
law of thermodynamics) [12].
Even if the measurements were really possible in principle, which I shall assume
for the sake of argument, the experiment would be extremely difficult, since one
might need to wait for a few billion years for conscious beings to evolve and die
out. One would presumably also need each system to be large in order to contain
an energy source such as the sun to last long enough in it. There also needs to be
a large enough garbage dump for the waste energy.
For example, in shining at its present luminosity for the age of the earth, the sun
produces about 5.5 × 1050 ergs of energy. If this is to be uniformly distributed as
thermal radiation over a volume large enough that the temperature be low enough
for the thermal disequilibrium necessary for life on earth, say below the freezing
point of water, one needs a volume bigger than about 1.3× 1055cm3, which fills out
a sphere of radius larger than about half a parsec or 1.5 light years. In units of
Boltzmann’s constant, the entropy of this radiation is more than about 1.94× 1064.
The exponential of this gives a rough estimate of the dimension of the relevant
Hilbert space, so one might need far more than 1010
64.59
measurements to determine
approximately all the relevant elements of the final density matrix of each system
(presuming each is identical and uncorrelated).
One might well need much larger individual systems and corresponding many,
many more measurements if one wanted a significant probability that conscious be-
ings would evolve in each. There is of course the staggering problem of where to
put all of these enormously many systems, since they must be kept far enough apart
that they do not interact enough to become sufficiently correlated. (A crude es-
timate of the requirement that the tidal interaction energy between the systems,
varying as the inverse cube of the distance, be less than the splitting of the energy
levels within one of the systems, puts the minimum distance between them as more
than 1010
63.81
light years The difference between the upper exponent here and that
previous is very nearly the common logarithm of twice three, or six, and different
plausible assumptions about the power law in the distance-dependence of the inter-
action energy would simply change this integer a bit but would leave the minimum
separation distance utterly enormous.)
Thus the experimental problem of determining whether or not information is
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fundamentally lost in conscious beings seems utterly impractical. However, it is
still trivial compared to the problem of determining experimentally whether or not
information is lost down black holes of the solar mass M⊙ = 9.14× 10
37 in Planck
units, which have thermal entropies around 4piM2⊙ ∼ 10
76.66 and would require more
than 1010
76.96
measurements to give a rough determination of the final density matrix
after black hole evaporates.
One can also amusingly calculate that if information is not lost, the Poincare´
recurrence time of an isolated black hole in a rigid nonpermeable box with stationary
boundary conditions should be of the order of the exponential of the number of
energy eigenstates with significant quantum components, which itself should be of
the order of the exponential of the thermal entropy. Therefore, for a black hole of
the solar mass, the Poincare´ recurrence time should be of the order of
tPoincare´ ∼ exp exp (4piM
2
⊙) ∼ 10
1010
76.66
Planck times, millenia, or whatever. (14)
For a black hole containing the mass within the presently visible region of our
universe, it should be of the order of
tPoincare´ ∼ 10
1010
10
2.08
Planck times, millenia, or whatever. (15)
Finally, if one takes the mass within what may be the entire universe in one of
Linde’s stochastic inflationary models [13] with a massive inflaton whose mass is
about m = 10−6 in Planck units, and puts this mass into a black hole in a suitable
box, one should get a Poincare´ recurrence time of the order of
tPoincare´ ∼ exp exp exp (4pim
−2) ∼ 1010
10
10
10
1.1
Planck times, millenia, or whatever.
(16)
So far as I know, these are the longest finite times that have so far been explicitly
calculated by any physicist.
I should again emphasize that I do not have strong reasons for proposing that
information is actually lost in conscious beings, but it does seem to be a logical
possibility, on a rather similar level to Hawking’s proposal [3] of information loss
down black holes. However, it is obvious from my papers [4, 5] that I am sceptical
of the latter, and I am similarly sceptical of the former.
On the other hand, even if information is not fundamentally lost down either
black holes or conscious beings, so that the evolution that includes them in the
intermediate states is described by a unitary S-matrix, one can still ask whether
these S-matrices are predictable in terms of presently-known physics. In the black
hole case it is fairly obvious that the S-matrix is not, because we do not yet have a
complete understandable quantum theory of gravity. In the case of conscious beings,
if their evolution can occur in situations in which nonlinear quantum gravity and
black holes have negligible effects or probabilities of occurring, one might suppose
that the S-matrix should be accurately described by the present Standard Model
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of particle physics (presumably augmented by enough gravitational interactions to
give a good approximation to Solar System dynamics).
Of course, we do not know the parameters of the Standard Model nearly ac-
curately enough for a calculation of the evolution of any large piece of matter for
any significant time (even for a calculation in principle, by computational or even
noncomputational means with unlimited resources). But one might ask whether
there is any precise choice of the unknown parameters, in the present form of the
Standard Model Lagrangian (including a sufficient amount of gravity), that would
give the S-matrix up to the accuracy that one would expect from, say, its neglect of
quantum nonlinear gravity and of Grand Unified processes such as baryon decay.
To test this by the procedure outlined above of actually measuring an ensemble
of initial and final systems seems inordinately difficult. One might hope to be able to
test it for a single conscious being, but to do that without letting the being evolve
naturally in a very large system over a very long time, one would need to know
how to create it, which might be difficult. Although by measuring the physical
states of enough conscious beings, one might learn how to create them on scales
much smaller than the Solar System, the scale and thermal entropy would still
presumably be sufficiently large that the number of measurements needed would
still be utterly enormous. (For example, a human of mass 70 kg has a dimensionless
thermal entropy on the order of 2×1028 and so would require of the order of 1010
28.24
measurements to determine the S-matrix.)
If these measurements could be done and were consistent with unitary evolution
(so that no information is fundamentally lost in the conscious beings), then I would
not be surprised to find that the S-matrix is not consistent with the Standard Model
with any choice of its parameters. Whether the difference would be attributed to
other new physics that has no particular connection with consciousness, or whether
it would be attributed to effects of consciousness, is an interesting question that will
have to wait until we gain a better understanding of these matters.
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